WORKSHOP ON MULTIUNIT ALLOCATION , April 26
A quick internet search for the marriage-market illustration yields this:
| Time | Speaker/Presentation |
| 9:30 - 10:30 am | Jacob Leshno (Columbia) A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| 10:45 - 11:45 am | Bumin Yenmez (CMU Econ) Matching with Externalities |
| 11:45 - 12:45 pm | Break |
| 12:45 - 1:45 pm | Michael Richter (Yeshiva) Continuum Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints |
| 2:00 - 3:00 pm | Gabriel Y. Weintraub (Columbia) Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Designs |
| 3:15 - 4:15 pm | Haoxiang Zhu (MIT) Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency in Dynamic Double Auctions |
| 4:30 - 5:30 pm | Tadashi Hashimoto (Yeshiva) Equilibrium Selection and Inefficiency in Internet Advertising Auctions |
Organizer: Mariann Ollar
Sponsored by the UPenn Market Design Working Group
*********************A quick internet search for the marriage-market illustration yields this:
| Caption | The Marriage Market in 1950. Anti-suffragette postcard. |
|---|---|
| Artist | English School (20th Century) |
| Artwork medium | colour lithograph |
| Copyright notice | © Look and Learn / Elgar Collection |